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57 E3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Danny Jones brought a Section 19832 action against
his employer, Sheriff Harold Plaster of Pittsylvania
County, Virginia, when Plaster refused to reappoint him
as deputy sheriff3 Prior to trial in the Western District
of Virginia, Plaster exercised four peremptory strikes
which excluded all African-Americans from the jury.
Plaster supported the strike of Preston, one of the pro-
spective jurors, by calling him "a follower and not a man
who would exercise independent judgment."4 Jones ob-
jected on the basis of Batson v. Kentucky,5 and the court
found each of the four strikes impermissible. The court
did not rule expressly that the strikes were Batson viola-
tions. Nevertheless, the court stated that the reasons
given were "just not substantial enough" and ordered
the parties to conduct a second round of jury selection
with the same panel of prospective members.
6
During the second round of jury selection, Plaster
struck Preston again. Preston was the only African-
American struck during the second round. When Jones
objected to this strike on Batson grounds, Plaster re-
sponded that Preston lacked "conviction and judgment."7
After accepting this reason and noting that two African-
Americans remained on the panel, the district court
overruled Jones' objection to the strike.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaster, and
Jones appealed. On appeal, Jones argued that the dis-
trict court erred by evaluating the second round of pe-
remptory strikes with the same low standard as it had
for the first. He argued that the court should have re-
quired more than race-neutral reason to defend success-
fully against a prima fade showing of discriminatory in-
tent.8 Once a prima fade case of race-based discrimina-
tion is shown, Jones argued, the court should have re-
quired Plaster to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he would have struck Preston regardless of
race.
9
'Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995).
242 U.S.C. §1983 (1979).
3 Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995). Jones al-
leged that Plaster had violated his First Amendment right to
free speech by refusing reappoint him as a result of his cam-
paigning against Plaster's opponent in a recent election. Id. at
418.
4 Id. at 419.
-Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6Jones, 57 E3d at 419.
71d.
8Jones, 57 F.3d at 420.
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit could
not decide whether the district court followed the ap-
propriate analysis for evaluating challenges to peremp-
tory strikes as set out in Batson v. Kentucky 0 and Howard
v. Senkowski." Accordingly, the court of appeals re-
manded the case for clarification. The court instructed
the district court to specify whether Plaster exercised
the second strike of Preston for a racially discriminatory
purpose, and, if so, whether the strike would have been
exercised notwithstanding that discriminatory purpose.
2
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
The court summarized for the district court the
proper analysis under Batson as modified by Hozvard.
The court of appeals instructed the district court to fol-
low this analysis in evaluating the second peremptory
strike of Preston. The court did not rule that a court
should examine the reasons for the strike of a juror dur-
ing a second round of jury selection with a standard of
scrutiny higher than Batson requires.
I. ANALYSIS UNDER BATSON AND HOWARD
Traditional Batson analysis instructs that the party
objecting to a peremptory strike on equal protection
grounds must make a prima facie case of intentional dis-
crimination using any "relevant circumstances." 3 After
the objecting party establishes a prima fae case, the
party who has exercised the strike must provide a race-
neutral reason for the strike.' 4 The objecting party can
overcome the race-neutral reason if it can show that the
reason is mere pretext for a race-based decision. 5 Fi-
nally, the court must determine whether the objecting
party has proved intentional discrimination by the strik-
ing party.6
9 Id.
"°Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
"1 Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1993).
'2Jones, 57 F.3d at 421-22.
'3 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
14 Id. at 97. See also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
359 (1991).
'sPurkett v. Jimmy Elem., 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1995)
(citing Batson). See also United States v. Brooks, 66 F.3d 317,
317 (4th Cir. 1995).
'6Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. See also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
359.
In Jones, the Fourth Circuit joined the Second and
Sixth Circuits in adopting Howard's "dual motivation"
analysis for Batson violations." Dual motivation analysis
allows a strike exercised for a racially discriminatory
purpose to stand if the-striking party can show that the
improper purpose was "only part, and not the decisive
part, of the motivation" behind the strike18 The Fourth
Circuit's adoption of Howard adds a step to the Batson
scheme by providing an affirmative defense to a Batson
violation. In Jones, the Fourth Circuit held that a strike
which violates Batson will stand nevertheless if the strik-
ing party proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have exercised the strike notwithstanding
an improper purpose. 9
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION
In Jones, the district court failed to follow either the
traditional Batson analysis or Batson analysis as supple-
mented by Howard. The district court judge overruled
Jones' objection to the Preston strike with the following
statement:
The history of the thing troubles me some... but
lack of conviction and lack of leadership aren't ex-
actly the same thing, and the information is he did
sorta go with the flow is I assume what you're saying
to me and did not perhaps stand up for what he be-
lieved in, and that was the basis of it, and particu-
larly given the fact that two blacks are left on the
panel and the fact that the plaintiff struck one of
the other blacks.Y°
Based on this reasoning, the court of appeals could not
sustain the district court's decision to overrule Jones'
objection.2' The statement may have meant that Plaster's
reason for striking Preston was race-neutral and that Jones
failed to prove discriminatory intent. On the other hand,
the statement may have meant that Jones proved dis-
criminatory intent but that Plaster would have struck
Preston regardless. The court of appeals could not deter-
7 United States v. Peraza, 25 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1994).
Following the Fourth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit adopted
Howard in United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir.
1995). The Court of Appeals of South Carolina adopted
Howard in Payton v. Kearse, 460 S.E.2d 220 (S.C. Ct. App.
1995).
18 Howard, 986 F.2d at 27.
19Jones, 57 F.3d at 421 (citing Howard, 986 F.2d at 26-
30).
20Id. at 419.
21 Id. at 421.
'See United States v. Darden, 1995 WL 689372 (8th Cir.
1995). This recent Eighth Circuit opinion illustrates an appel-
late court's willingness to interpret a garbled ruling by a dis-
trict court. The district court in Darden stated:
mine the dispositive factors of the district court's ruling.
Despite the lack of clarity in the district court's state-
ment, the court of appeals had the latitude to interpret
it.7z The court may have avoided interpreting the state-
ment because it wished to avoid reversing the district
court. The court of appeals certainly could not have sus-
tained the district court's ruling under any reasonable
interpretation of the district court's statement.
The court of appeals could not have sustained the
district court's ruling based on a conclusion that "lack of
conviction" was race-neutral. In order to have sustained
the ruling, the court of appeals would have had to con-
duded that the reason offered for the first strike of
Preston was different than the reason offered for the
second strike. The district court did not articulate the
difference between the reason offered for the first strike
(Preston was "a man who would not exercise indepen-
dent judgment"), and the reason offered for the second
strike (Preston was a man who lacked "conviction and
judgment'. The district court rejected the former rea-
son, stating, "[Mr Preston] wouldn't be a [school] prin-
cipal unless he had some leadership abilities. It's too co-
incidental to let stand .... ."3 The district court found
that the first strike had a discriminatory purpose and
that the reason supplied was a pretext for that purpose.
Conversely, the district court seemed to accept "lack
of conviction" as at least part of a permissible basis on
which to sustain the second strike. First, the court
recharacterized the reason offered for the first strike as
'lack of leadership." Then the court stated simply that
'lack of leadership" and "lack of conviction" were differ-
ent. In light of a trial court's "first-hand knowledge and
observation of the critical events," an appellate court must
give great deference to the trial court's conclusions re-
garding discriminatory intent. 4 The difference between
"a man who would not exercise independent judgment"
and a man who lacked "conviction and judgment" was
not apparent to the court of appeals. Because the dis-
trict court failed to articulate any difference, the court
of appeals could not have affirmed the district court's
ruling; however, it did not reverse the court's ruling. In-
stead, the court of appeals remanded for clarification.
[Counsel's] reason for striking a young black woman
was not a racially neutral reason and I still say that,
that cause that are non-racially-they are racially
neutral-the other reasons you stated .... For that
reason I'm allowing the strike .... [T]he other rea-
sons you gave give the basis for being a strike.
Id. at *17. The Circuit Court held that the court's decision
was "equivalent to a finding that the prosecutor would have
exercised the strike even without the one non-racially neutral
motive." Id.
23 Jones, 57 E3d at 419.
'4 United States v. Grandison, 885 E2d 143, 146 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990).
Likewise, the court of appeals could not have sus-
tained the district court's ruling based on a conclusion
that Jones had proved discriminatory intent but that
Plaster would have struck Preston regardless. By that the
district court's statement could have meant that the dis-
trict court had used dual motivation analysis, the court
of appeals implied that the Howard analysis had been
available to the district court even though Jones was the
first Fourth Circuit case to adopt it. Presumably, the dis-
trict court would have been unlikely to adopt Howard
on its own. Hence, the court of appeals may have been
suggesting to the district court that its ruling might be
different with an added step in the Batson analysis.?
In order to reach the Howard step of the Batson
analysis, a court must acknowledge that an attorney's
reasons for striking a prospective juror are race-based
but that the attorney had sufficient permissible reasons
for the strike. The attorney must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he would have struck the pro-
spective juror regardless of the juror's race. The record
in Jones does not reflect that Plaster met this burden of
proof The only other reason that Plaster offered for the
strike was in reference to the makeup of the final jury.
The district court observed that two African-Ameri-
cans remained on the final jury and that Jones had struck
one African-American from the panel. If the court of
appeals had concluded that either observation was a
dispositive factor in the district court's ruling, it would
have been obliged to reverse based on United States v.
Joe.26 In Joe, the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's
denial of a Batson motion when the denial was based on
the district court's observation that black persons were
in the final jury. The district court in Joe stated that be-
cause "black jurors were seated and participated on the
jury no Batson violation could occur."27 The Fourth Cir-
cuit responded:
MWihile the fact that black jurors were seated is en-
titled to substantial consideration, it is not
dispositive of this issue and does not preclude a find-
ing that defendants established a prima facie viola-
tion of Batson.u
The composition of the final jury is only one of the many
relevant factors that a court may consider before ruling
on discriminatory intent. Hence, the presence or absence
of black jurors cannot be dispositive of discriminatory
intent in a peremptory stdke 7 If the district court's state-
2-The court of appeals may have been suggesting that the
district court's ruling should, in fact, be different under a
Howard analysis.
26 United States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991).
27 d. at 102.
28 d. at 103.
29Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (stating that a"'pattem' of strikes
ment in Jones meant that the final composition of the
jury precluded a finding of discriminatory intent, the
court of appeals would have been obliged to reverse
based on Joe. Therefore, if the court of appeals for Jones
had interpreted the district court's statement as fulfill-
ing the Howard analysis, it would have had to reverse
the district court ruling.
The court of appeals could have interpreted the dis-
trict court's according to Batson or Howard, but any in-
terpretation would have beckoned a reversal of the dis-
trict court's ruling. Clearly, the court of appeals wished
to avoid reversing the district court. Clearly, it did not
understand how the district court could declare the first
strike impermissible on Batson grounds and allow the
second strike to stand.
The district court's statement in Jones indicates that
it at least considered the first Batson violation before
ruling on the second strike ("[t]he history of the thing
bothers me'). The "history of the thing" must have in-
cluded the court's finding that the striking attorney had
exercised a race-based strike specifically against Preston.
The "history of the thing" also must have included the
court's knowledge that the reason Plaster had supplied
for the first strike was pretext for racially discriminatory
intent. Although the court found that Plaster had in-
tended to strike Preston based on race during the first
round of jury selection, the court failed to find this in-
tent during the second round. In fact, the discrimina-
tory intent proved for the first strike of Preston had little
impact on the court's appraisal of the second strike of
Preston.
III. NO NEW REMEDY FOR A BATSON VIOLA-
TION
Despite this understandable confusion, the court of
appeals made no comment on the district court's rem-
edy for the violation of Batson during the first round of
jury selection. The court of appeals simply stated that
granting a second round of jury selection was within the
district court's discretion.30 The court of appeals could
have recommended a different remedy to the district
court.3' It could have recommended that the district
court evaluate the second strike of Preston under higher
standard on remand, in compliance with Jones' sugges-
tion.
The court of appeals elected not to affirm a ruling
that was logically obscure. The court did not attempt to
against black jurors... might give rise to an inference of dis-
crimination").
s0 Chandle, 57 F.3d at 419 n.
31 "In light to the variety of jury selection practices fol-
lowed in our state and federal trial courts, we make no at-
tempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our hold-
ing today." Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24.
piece together the district court ruling because reversal
would have been imminent under any interpretation.
Instead, the court of appeals gave the district court the
opportunity to reconsider its holding and to make a co-
hesive ruling.
CONCLUSION
Both the district court and the court of appeals opin-
ions fail to give Batson violations any meaningful regard.
In Jones, despite the district court finding the race-neu-
tral reason to be pretext for a Batson violation, the court
gave the violating attorney a second.chance to use his
peremptory strikes. The district court judge's only com-
ment to Plaster's counsel was a weak admonishment:
'When you strike a black this go-round you're going to
have to have a sound articulable reason for doing so other
than race."32 The district court judge rewards the violat-
ing attorney by allowing the second strike of the same
prospective juror to stand.
After Jones, a prior Batson violation within the trial
in which the current Batson violation is challenged is
simply one factor among all the factors in traditional
Batson analysis. It is not a factor weightier than others in
determining whether or not further Batson violations
have occurred. This apparent lack of concern is not un-
common in federal courts. For example, race-neutral
reasons need not be strong to rebut a primafacie case of
discriminatory intent.33 In addition, one challenge to a
jury strike sustained on Batson grounds will not estab-
lish the validity of other Batson challenges.' Jones dem-
onstrates that district courts residing in the Fourth Cir-
cuit must adhere closely to Batson analysis.3s On the other
hand, Jones demonstrates that attorneys can thwart
Batson's purpose without much trouble.
Jones is one case in a line of jurisprudence which
relaxes the equal protection demands on attorneys who
exercise peremptory strikes. For example, Batson had
required that a race-neutral reason be "dear and reason-
ably specific" 36 and related to the case to be tried37 in
order to rebut a prima fade case of discriminatory in-
tent. Since the holding in Purkett v. Elem., however, the
race-neutral reason does not have to be persuasive, plau-
32Jones, 57 F.3d at 419 (quoting from the district court
opinion).
33 See United States v. Lorenzo, 995 E2d 1448 (9th Cir.
1993) (upholding an exclusion based on a Hawaiian or
Polynesian juror's long hair, long beard, and general hippie-
like appearance). See also Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (uphold-
ing exclusion based on hair length and facial hair); United States
v. Sandoval, 997 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1993) (accepting youth-
fulness, being a cosmetologist, and lack of high education as
race-neutral reasons); United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388
(3d. Cir. 1993) (upholding an exclusion of a black juror based
on her being a single parent, working as postal worker, and
living on rental property).
sible, or even related to the issues of the case.38 The rea-
son must not even make sense.39 It must be merely "a
reason that does not deny equal protection."40 Moreover,
Batson unambiguously stated that "the Equal Protection
Clause forbids [an attorney] to challenge potential ju-
rors solely on account of their race."4' Howard holds, on
the other hand, that even when race is a factor in an
attorney's decision to strike a juror, the strike will stand
if the attorney can articulate an appropriate alternative
defense . 42 In addition, the court in Doss considered the
prior Batson violations within the trial but did not give
those violations any noteworthy weight.43 Finally, in
Jones, the Batson violation for the first round of strikes
did not visibly affect the ruling in the second round of
strikes.
Each case is a step away from the Batson court's
goal of eliminating equal protection violations due to
impermissible peremptory strikes. Each case tends to
confirm a fear which Justice Marshall articulated in his
Batson concurrence: that attorneys are essentially "free
to discriminate against blacks in jury selection provided
that they hold that discrimination to an 'acceptable'
level."44
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit should
strengthen Batson's bite by intensifying the consequences
of violating the Batson standard. First, courts should give
serious consideration to prior Batson violations within a
trial. For instance, the district court in Jones should have
weighed its previous identification of a Batson violation
heavily against the striking attorney's race-neutral rea-
son supplied in the second round of jury selection. In
addition, courts should consider sanctioning attorneys
who use their peremptory strikes to commit Batson vio-
lations.
Batson is a not only a constitutional standard, but
also a procedural standard which attorneys must uphold.
Because the Batson contains a procedural component,
nothing prevents courts from holding attorneys who vio-
late Batson in contempt. If a court finds that a striking
attorney has committed a Batson violation, the oppos-
ing attorney should move the court to hold the striking
attorney in contempt. If the court elects to send the vio-
lating attorney to prison, it should suspend the sentence
34Doss v. Frontenac, 14 F.3d 1313, 1317 (8th Cir. 1994)
(citing United States v. Baker, 855 E2d 1353) 1360 (1988)).
35 But see supra, note 22.
36 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20 (quoting Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).37Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
38Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (1995).
39Id. at 1771.
40 Id.
41Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
42 Doss, 14 F.3d at 1317.
43 Howard, 986 E2d at 27.
"Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).
until after the conclusion of the trial. By holding a vio-
lating attorney in contempt, a court can punish that at-
torney while bypassing the client of that attorney.
45
The opposing attorney also should ask the court to
order the violating attorney to pay reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the violation.46 In
addition, the opposing attorney should ask the court to
allow the juror in question to sit; to take one peremp-
tory strike from the violating attorney; and to grant that
strike to the opposing attorney. This arrangement both
prevents the violating attorney from getting a "second
chance" with the impermissible strike and balances the
number of jurors on the final panel. It would bring our
4 Other remedies for violations of Batson are available
only with the danger of skewing the trial at the expense of one
party. For example, a court could remove the violating
attorney's peremptory strikes altogether in a second round of
jury selection, and it could grant them to the opposing attor-
ney. Alternatively, a court could limit the number of peremp-
tory strikes available to the violating attorney in a second round
of jury selection.A court also could require the violating attor-
ney to rebut a primafade case of discriminatory intent with a
reason that is better than race neutral. For example, a court
could take the plaintiffs suggestion in Jones and skip to the
Howard step of the Batson analysis once a party shows a prima
system closer to the Batson court's goal of eliminating
equal protection violations in peremptory strikes.
Justice Marshall has suggested that the only way to
eliminate racial discrimination completely from peremp-
tory strikes is to eliminate peremptory strikes com-
pletely.47 His concurring opinion in Batson emphasized
that "the right of peremptory challenge is not of consti-
tutional magnitude."48 Decidedly, no court has indicated
that it intends any such drastic end to peremptory strikes.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Tracy Quackenbush
fade case of discriminatory intent. Each of these alternative
remedies risk prejudicing the violating attorney's client. Hold-
ing the violating attorney in contempt with the sentence sus-
pended until after the conclusion of the trial, however,
minimalizes this risk.
46 See Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts for similar sanctions which courts
may impose on attorneys and parties for failure to comply with
the rules of discovery.
47Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring).
4 8 Id. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring).
